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ABSTRACT∗
We characterize competitive equilibrium in markets (financial etc.) where price taking
Bayesian decision makers screen to accept or reject applicants. Unlike signaling models,
equilibrium fails to resolve imperfect information. In classical statistics terminology, some
qualified applicants are rejected (type I error) and some unqualified applicants are accepted (type
II error). We report three new results: i. optimal firm behavior is deduced to be a Bayesian
variant of the Neyman-Pearson theorem; ii. competitive equilibrium entails screening if and only
if (net of screening costs) the cost of type II errors exceed the cost of type I errors, i.e. contrary to
signaling (where buyers identify more qualified applicants who self screen to differentiate
themselves e.g. Stiglitz 1975), price taking firms screen to avoid lower quality sellers; iii.
equilibrium groups the least attractive applicants into a single high risk assignment pool.
Depending on costs of screening, the unique equilibrium may involve complete pooling
(all applicants trade at one price) or partial separation (there are m separate pools with successive
pools supported by a single (rising) price and a subset of agents of different screen levels trading
at that price). A screening equilibrium has m ≥ 2 and the mth secondary market entails no
screening, as the most adversely selected agents are assigned to the high risk pool.
Screening induces market segmentation.
Invariably secondary markets contain
individuals who with better or different screening mechanisms could be accepted in the primary
market. What roles traits such as ethnicity, gender, and race might assume in such decision
making is relegated to subsequent research to explore the statistical theory of discrimination.
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Under what circumstances do firms invest resources to purchase information about potential
transaction partners, i.e. when do competitive firms screen? Signaling models suggest that competitive
firms confronting imperfect information about traders screen to identify and capture gains from trade
with higher quality agents.1 But that intuition can be misleading. In the setting examined here, when
the gains from trade with higher quality agents are sufficiently high, firms do not screen! Competitive
firms screen only to avoid relatively costly low quality agents. This paper examines the properties of
competitive equilibrium in markets where price taking Bayesian decision makers use a screening
mechanism to accept or reject applicants. We consider market settings where signaling behavior is
inappropriate. Consumers seeking credit have every intention of repaying their loans and retaining the
properties (homes, autos, consumer durables) purchased with their loans. Each purchaser of insurance is
optimistic about her prospects of not presenting an insurance claim. In general, applicants are not (in
any statistical sense) informed with respect to their relative merit vis a vis other applicants.2
Firms offer the existing market price to applicants who pass the screen and reject those who do
not. Market segmentation is a natural outcome of the screening process. Because rejected applicants are
not permitted to participate in the primary market, their presence is the basis for the formation of
secondary markets. Screening equilibria are generally composed of m > 1 segmented markets where
applicants face increasingly adverse terms of trade as they descend down the hierarchy of segmented
markets.

The increasingly adverse terms of trade occur in secondary markets because prices are

determined by the characteristics of applicants whose qualifications are characterized by a distribution
truncated from above by the loss of previously accepted applicants who screen more favorably and
hence trade in more advantageous markets.

1

The discussion in Stiglitz 1975, pp. 286 and 290 suggests this intuition.
There exists no systematic asymmetry of information that could serve as foundation for a self-selected
signal that is adequately correlated with applicants’ true relative quality.
2
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The interpretation of the segmented markets depends on the institutional setting. For example, in
the setting examined here (financial markets) the same firm may operate in different segments of the
market and applicants may simply be thought to be offered one of the firm’s loan packages or insurance
policies. In other institutional settings where up or down decisions are common practices such as
education and job markets it is more appropriate to see institutions operating in only one of the
segmented markets. Acceptance decisions by schools and employers are important examples of the
competitive screening processes examined in this paper and many of the market properties deduced for
financial markets apply to them as well. However, school and job markets present complexities that are
not explored in this paper.
What we shall call binary choice competitive screening is quite appropriate for investigating
economic phenomena such as statistical discrimination. One reason for this suitability is that binary
choice screening decisions occur within an economic context that does not resolve the imperfect
information inherent to the market transaction.3 Even in equilibrium, firms’ accept and reject decisions
are inherently prone to error. In the terminology of classical statistics, some qualified applicants are
rejected (type 1 error) and some unqualified applicants are accepted (type 2 error). This implies that
invariably secondary markets will contain individuals who if firms had used better or simply different
screening mechanisms could have been accepted in the primary market. What role traits such as
ethnicity, gender, and race assume in such decision-making and the allocation of resources becomes all
the more important in light of a salient implication of binary choice screening. We show (Remark 1)
that competitive equilibrium entails screening only if the costs of making type II errors are high relative
to the costs of making type I errors. In effect, competitive firms screen to identify and avoid lower
quality sellers, a motivation rife with discriminatory dangers when different social groups are subject to

3

Allocation decisions are not predicated on a screening process whose equilibrium prices generate perfect
information as in common models of signaling (cf. Spence 1973 and Stiglitz 1975).
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stereotyping. Subsequent research will examine the implications of such screening for understanding
market phenomena such as statistical discrimination and so called predatory lending practices in markets
where a wide degree of segmentation is actually observed. This paper characterizes some important
properties of competitive equilibrium with binary choice screening.
The equilibrium concept used is the Nash equilibrium. It is assumed that firms maximize
expected profits without regard to competitors’ strategies and that there is free entry of firms so that only
zero profit equilibria are considered.

Several interesting properties of such equilibria are demonstrated.

First, under similar conditions where Nash equilibrium often fails to exist Rothschild-Stiglitz (1976),
Wilson (1977), Jaynes (1979), and Riley (1979) the binary choice screening model studied has a Nash
equilibrium under standard assumptions of economic competition. We show a unique competitive
equilibrium exists.

Furthermore, depending on the costs of screening relative to the value of its

information, that equilibrium may involve complete pooling (all heterogeneous applicants trade at one
price) or partial separation (there are m separate pools with each pool supported by a price and a subset
of agents of different screen levels trading at that price). The least desirable secondary market entails no
screening, as the most adversely selected agents are assigned to the high-risk pool.

1. Screens and Screening Mechanisms
In a variety of market settings, firms sort products and services into the binary categories
qualified and unqualified.

Denote qualified and unqualified applicants by q1 = 1 and q 0 = 0

respectively. It is assumed firms cannot determine whether an applicant is qualified or unqualified until
after she is accepted. However, for a cost a firm may observe a numerical indicator x [0 ≤ x ≤ 1] that is
positively correlated with applicant qualifications and therefore may be used to predict an applicant’s
subsequent value to the firm. A screen assigns to each applicant just such a numerical indicator.

5

Generally, a screen is a function h : R N → R where z an element of R N is a vector of observable

characteristics (e.g. debt, late payments, past insurance claims, age, gender, income, etc). An example
of a screen is a regression model whose independent variables may be termed the screening criteria and
whose dependent variable is used to rank applicants. Less formally (and more commonly used) a screen
is any scalar-valued ranking of applicants that is based on an objective or subjective probability model.
Associated with a screen is a joint probability density f ( x, q) that gives the probability that an
applicant of quality q is screened x. In terms of the conditional probabilities computable from the joint
probability density, a screen is associated with a probability density f ( x qi ) that gives the conditional
probability that an applicant of true qualification i will be screened x . A screening process is a screen
h(.) mapping applicant characteristics to a scalar x and an associated conditional probability function
f ( x qi ) indicating the probability an applicant of quality qi is screened x.

Hereafter, the respective

conditional probability densities will be denoted f i ( x) and their cumulative distributions by Fi ( x) . We
refer to such probability functions as screening probabilities and we restrict the screening probabilities
considered to those belonging to a subset of the continuously differentiable probability densities defined
on the unit interval.
For any screen screening process and f 0 ( x) > 0, consider the likelihood ratio R ( x) =

f1 ( x)
. R(x)
f 0 ( x)

is the relative likelihood that an applicant screened x is qualified. We say a screen is efficient if its
likelihood ratio satisfies the monotone likelihood ratio condition (see Milgrom, 1981),

R ′( x) =

f 0 ( x)⋅ f1' ( x)− f1 ( x)⋅ f 0' ( x)
> 0 ∀x.
f 0 ( x )2

Eliminating the denominator of R ′(x) shows efficient screens satisfy condition
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P1.

f 1' ( x) f 0' ( x)
>
∀x.
f1 ( x) f 0 ( x)

An increase in x increases the proportion of qualified applicants more than it increases the proportion of
unqualified applicants. Therefore, any increase in the observed screening value increases the relative
likelihood that an applicant is qualified. If this condition were not satisfied, all kinds of perverse results
could occur and the underlying screening process would not be a very good one. We only consider
efficient screens.
A screening mechanism is composed of a screen and a decision criterion that accepts or rejects
applicants on the basis of the indicator x assigned to the applicant by the screen. A decision criterion is
a discrete function d (⋅) that maps the unit interval, the space of possible screen values, to the binary set

q of possible qualification values so that 0 and 1 also signify reject and accept. Thus, the value d(x)
(equal 0 or 1) indicates whether an applicant screened x is accepted or rejected. We exploit certain
properties of efficient screens. The most important of these properties is that a rational decision maker
who has chosen to accept applicants who are screened at some indicator x1 will accept all applicants for
whom x > x1 .

Thus, the screening mechanism will have the property that there exists an x ∗ such that

the decision criterion d (⋅) satisfies:
d ( x) =

1 x ≥ x∗
0 x < x∗.

Another important property of efficient screens is that the conditional probability densities they
generate can cross at most one point. Since R(x) is strictly increasing, once the densities cross at some
screen value x ′ (referred to as the switch point), f1 > f 0 must be true for all greater values of the
screen. It follows that if both densities are to integrate to 1 on the unit interval, then P2 must be true:
P2:

f 0 (0) > f 1 (0).

7

2. Competitive Screening Markets

Consider a market where a very large number of applicants Ν (each with the identical
reservation price R ≥ 0 apply at no cost to one of many identical risk neutral firms. Successful
applicants receive a reward valued at r > 0 and unsuccessful applicants receive nothing. All agents and
firms are price takers, applicants accept any offer that equals or exceeds the reservation price and they
reject any offer below the prevailing market price.

N q < N of the applicants are qualified and the

remainder are not. The returns to firms are normalized so that for each accepted applicant a firm
receives an economic value v > 0 for each qualified and 0 for each unqualified applicant.
Decision makers base their choices on Bayesian expectations of applicants’ qualifications.
Assume that any necessary learning process has taken place and that agents know the screening process
and the distributions it generates. Let qˆ =

Nq
N

denote the true proportion of qualified applicants. Then

q̂ is the decision maker’s prior expectation of the probability that any given applicant is qualified. If a
firm elects to screen applicants, Bayes’ Law ensures that the posterior expectation an applicant is
qualified is p (q1 x) =

f1 ( x)
⋅ qˆ , where g ( x) = qˆ ⋅ f1 ( x) + (1 − qˆ ) ⋅ f 0 ( x).
g ( x)

Ignoring screening costs, the expected return from accepting an applicant screened at x is
simply the expected value added minus the certain reward payment.

π ( x) = p (q1 x) ⋅ (v − r ) − [1 − p (q1 x)] ⋅ r = p(q1 x) ⋅ v − r.
Given a decision rule d (⋅) that accepts all applicants screened at or above some x and rejects all others
(neglecting screening costs) the expected return from n screened applications is
1

πˆ ( x , d ) = n ⋅ ∫ π ( x) ⋅ d ( x) g ( x)dx = n ⋅ [1 − F1 ( x )] ⋅ qˆ ⋅ v − n ⋅ [1 − G ( x )] ⋅ r.
0
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The first four terms after the second equal sign represent expected value added from accepted applicants
and the last three terms are expected payments to applicants who pass the screen. Setting x = 0 and
assuming free entry of firms will drive expected returns to zero so that πˆ = 0 we find qˆ ⋅ v = rˆ. This is
the no screening pooling equilibrium. As would be expected, in competitive equilibrium with free entry,
if there is no screening of applicants and firms are risk neutral the expected return from a random
applicant (as determined by firms’ prior q̂ ) will just equal the reward paid to each accepted applicant.
Credit and insurance markets are two institutional specifications of the model.
Credit Market: Here r is the size of the loan received by borrowers, and v is the loan repayment
(principal plus interest) required by the lender. The stipulated gross return is ρ =
interest is i =

v
and the rate of
r

v−r
1
1 − qˆ
• 100% = ( ρ − 1) • 100%. In the pooling equilibrium, ρ =
and i =
• 100%.
r
q̂
qˆ

Insurance Market: Here r is the insurance premium paid by the insured and v is the indemnity paid by
the insurer in the event of a claim.4
Returning to the general model, we note that if qˆ ≥

R
there always exists a unique allocation
v

that pools all applicants at the same price and involves no screening. Throughout the remainder of the
paper it is assumed that this condition is satisfied. The pooling allocation is the competitive equilibrium
if screening is not cost effective. If screening is cost effective, the competitive equilibrium is defined by
the allocation (screening versus no screening) offering applicants the greater reward. Below it will be
shown that whether or not screening is present at the competitive equilibrium depends on the net value
of the information obtainable from screening. To examine this issue firms’ optimal behavior must be
considered in more detail.
4

For the insurance market, variables must be redefined and the profit function rewritten to reflect the nature
of the assets being traded.
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All firms have access to the same screening technology. Let c(n) equal the cost of screening n
applicants. We assume that the screen requires some kind of formal interview or application process
followed by a checking of successful applicant’s references and background materials. Under these
conditions, assume that average screening costs conform to the classic case of the competitive firm
whose average costs decrease initially and then increase after reaching the optimal scale n ∗ . During the
rest of the paper screening costs are assumed to conform to this case.
Considering screening costs, the objective function of a firm utilizing a screening mechanism
with the acceptance screen equal to x and screening n applicants is πˆ ( x, d ) − c(n) or:
qˆ ⋅ v ⋅ n ⋅ [1 − F1 ( x)] − r ⋅ n ⋅ [1 − G ( x)] − c(n).

This objective function warrants discussion. Again the first four terms are expected revenues, the prior
probability ( q̂ ) that an applicant is qualified times the expected gain from qualified applicants screened
x or above. The middle two terms represent the expected total rewards paid to accepted applicants (the

expected number screened at or above the rejection index). The last term of course is total screening
cost. Unlike the no screening case, some applicants are now rejected. Reading from right to left there is
increasing attrition with respect to the three occurrences of n within the objective function. All n
applicants screened contribute to screening costs, but a smaller number ( n ⋅ [1 − G ( x)], those passing the
screen) are accepted and paid the reward, and a still smaller number ( n ⋅ [1 − F1 ( x)], those accepted and
qualified) add value to the firm.

3. The Optimal Screening Rule and the Neyman-Pearson Theorem

An optimal strategy for a firm entails its choices of the number of applicants to screen and an
acceptance policy or decision rule defined by the minimum x ∗ required for an applicant to be accepted.
Assuming an interior solution (i.e. the firm indeed screens):
10

dπˆ
= qˆ ⋅ v ⋅ [1 − F1 ( x * )] − r * ⋅ [1 − G ( x * )] − c ′(n * ) = 0
dn

(A)

dπˆ
= −qˆ ⋅ v ⋅ f 1 ( x ∗ ) + r ∗ ⋅ g ( x ∗ ) = 0
dx

(B)

Condition (A) states that at the optimum the expected net value added of the last applicant screened
should just equal the marginal cost of screening her. (B) is an important condition that will aid
understanding of screening equilibria. With a little manipulation of the equation:
f1 ( x ∗ )
⋅ qˆ ⋅ v = p(q1 x ∗ ) ⋅ v = r ∗ .
∗
g(x )

(C)

The optimizing firm sets its decision rule so that the expected value added of the minimally acceptable
applicant is just equal to the reward paid those accepted. Note that the expectation is made in terms of
the decision maker’s posterior probability that the applicant is qualified conditional on the screen.
Two aspects of the optimal decision rule are worthy of fuller discussion. First, we note that with
more rearrangement of terms equation (B) can be rewritten as
f 1 ( x ∗ ) (1 − qˆ ) ⋅ r ∗
=
= k.
f 0 ( x ∗ ) qˆ ⋅ (v − r ∗ )

(C’)

The left hand side of this equation is the relative likelihood an applicant screened x* is qualified. Since
this likelihood function is monotone increasing in x, all rejected applicants have a relative likelihood less
than k. And thus, the optimal decision rule takes the form of the Neyman-Pearson likelihood ratio test
(Degroot, 1969; Christian, 1994; Bernardo and Smith, 1994). Moreover, because the optimal decision
rule requires that an applicant be rejected if and only if the likelihood function [R(x)] is less than a
constant k of this particular form (e.g. k is the relative expected cost of type II and type I errors), the
optimal decision rule is equivalent to a Bayesian variant of the Neyman-Pearson theorem of classical
statistics.
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Recall that the Neyman-Pearson theorem refers to a test of a simple null hypothesis (e.g.
q = q1 ) against a simple alternative ( q = q 0 ). It states, if there exists a positive constant k and a region

C

of

the

set

of

possible

decision

variables

x

with

∫

C

f1 ( x)dx = α

such

that

R( x) ≥ k for x ∉C and R( x) < k for x ∈C then C is a most powerful critical region of size α (equal
probability of type 1 error) for rejecting the null hypothesis. Alternatively, k is equivalent to the
inverse of the Lagrange multiplier determined by the optimization problem choose x to minimize the
probability of a type II error subject to the constraint that the probability of a type I error equals α.
A well known criticism of this classical theory is its arbitrary choice of α. Since the value of the
Lagrange multiplier may be interpreted as the shadow price of type II error probability in terms of type I
error probability, the question becomes how do you determine an optimal tradeoff between the two error
types? The Bayesian firm maximizing expected profit eliminates the arbitrary choice of α by evaluating
this tradeoff in terms of the relative costs of the two types of errors. Equation (B) and its variants (C)
and (C’) are easily seen to be the solution to the alternative optimization program: minimize the
weighted sum of the probabilities of type I and type II errors. That is, choose x to minimize the function
a ⋅ F1 ( x) + b ⋅ [1 − F0 ( x)] .
Where F1(x) and 1-F0(x) are the conditional probabilities of making type I and type II errors respectively
when x is the minimum screen acceptable. The weights a and b (whose ratio equals k) are equal to the
expected losses incurred from the respective error types, qˆ ⋅ (v − r ) and (1 − qˆ ) ⋅ r. It follows from this
discussion that the minimum x* determining the optimal decision criterion is a function of the relative
costs of type II and type I errors. Below this will prove important to our discussion of the equilibrium
properties of the model.
The second point worthy of fuller discussion is the implication from optimization condition C
that the optimal decision rule accepts applicants (those at or slightly above the optimal x ∗ ) who are not
12

expected to contribute enough value to cover the marginal cost of accepting them, r ∗ + c ′(n). This is
because screening costs are a sunk cost. Once an applicant is screened, if she is expected to contribute
more than r ∗ to the firm, accepting her is optimal because she contributes something to the payment of
the fixed screening costs.
With free entry competition should drive firms’ returns to zero so a third condition is needed to
characterize equilibrium with screening.
qˆ ⋅ v ⋅ n ∗ ⋅ [1 − F1 ( x ∗ )] − r ∗ ⋅ n ∗ [1 − G ( x ∗ )] − c(n ∗ ) = 0

(D)

Together conditions (A) and (D) require the standard competitive equilibrium result that average and
marginal screening costs be equal and that therefore n* equals the optimal (low cost) number of
applicants to screen. Obviously, if there is no screening in equilibrium the strict inequality (<) obtains in
equations (A) and (B).
We are now in a position to clarify the concept of competitive equilibrium used in this paper.
Let η i and N i denote respectively the number of firms and applicants in the ith market. Define a
competitive

{

screening

equilibrium

as

a

sequence

}

of

m

set ri∗ , xi∗ , n ∗ , η i* , N i∗ , N ; i = 1….m where ri∗ > ri∗+1 , xi∗ > xi∗+1 , n ∗ =

markets

N i∗

η i*

characterized

by

a

, N i∗ ≤ N and ri∗ ≥ R; xi∗ ≥ 0.

If xi∗ = 0 , competitive equilibrium entails no screening in market i. In that case, condition (D) holds
with c(0) = 0. Letting q̂i denote the proportion of applicants in segmented market i who are qualified,
we have ri∗ = qˆ i ⋅ v and conditions (A) and (B) are satisfied with the strict inequality (<) holding. In this
case, it is obvious that i = m. If xi∗ > 0 competitive equilibrium entails screening in market i and each of
conditions (A) (B) and (D) are satisfied by the equality signs.
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4. CHARACTERIZATION OF EQUILIBRIA

We begin by discussing the primary market. For convenience the subscript i =1 designating the
primary market is omitted. Condition (B) characterizing the firm’s optimal screening decision rule
defines x as an implicit function of r, v, and q̂. Suppressing the parameters v and q̂, denoting that
function as x(r ), and differentiating implicitly:

dx
g ( x) 2
>0
=
dr qˆ ⋅ v ⋅ [ g ( x) ⋅ f1′( x) − f 1 ( x) ⋅ g ′( x)]
because the monotone likelihood condition ensures that the value within the brackets is positive.
Increasing the reward to accepted applicants intensifies the screening criterion. An increase in r holding
v and q̂ constant raises the relative cost of a false positive acceptance decision vis a vis a false negative
and induces the firm to raise its indicator of quality to reduce the likelihood of accepting unqualified
applicants.
Let r0 and r1 satisfy respectively, i = x(ri ), i = 0, 1 and define the function

Φ(r ) = qˆ ⋅ v ⋅ n ∗ ⋅ [1 − F1 ( x(r ))] − r ⋅ n ∗⋅ ⋅ [1 − G ( x(r ))] − c(n ∗ ).
From (D) we see that for each reward price r, Φ(r ) defines the expected return to firms who have
optimized with respect to conditions (A) and (B). Therefore, any values of r that set Φ(r) = 0 will satisfy
all three of the equilibrium conditions (A), (B), and (D) and will define an equilibrium with screening
for the appropriate number of firms.

Φ(r) is continuously differentiable on the open interval ( r0 , r1 ) with a first derivative
Φ ′(r ) = n ∗ ⋅ [r ⋅ g ( x(r )) − qˆ ⋅ v ⋅ f 1 ( x(r ))] ⋅

dx
− n ∗ ⋅ [1 − G ( x(r ))].
dr

By the optimal screening rule (condition (B)) the terms in the first set of brackets vanish everywhere on
the interval (r0 , r1 ) . Therefore,
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Φ ′(r ) = −n ∗ ⋅ [1 − G ( x(r ))] < 0 for r0 < r < r1 .
Φ ′′(r ) = n ∗ ⋅ g ( x(r )) ⋅

Moreover,

dx
≥ 0.
dr

Furthermore, Φ (r1 ) = −c(n*) < 0. Therefore, if we find necessary and sufficient conditions for Φ (r0 ) to
be positive we will have demonstrated that Φ(r) is a strictly decreasing convex continuous function on
the interval [r0 , r1 ] that attains positive and negative values at the respective endpoints and therefore
must vanish at some unique r ∗ contained within the closed interval. That unique r ∗ would be a
candidate to be a competitive equilibrium with screening.
We note Φ(r0 ) = n ∗ ⋅ [qˆ ⋅ v − r0 ] − c(n ∗ ). Recall x(r0 ) = 0 and note further that when there is
screening and the reward is r0 , each firm plans to accept every applicant just as in the no screening
allocation with complete pooling of applicants. Therefore because every qualified applicant is hired in
either case, the expected value added from an accepted applicant (qˆ ⋅ v ) is the same in both cases. Thus
the difference between expected returns per applicant in the two cases is just the difference in total costs
per applicant. This cost differential is given by [rˆ −(r0 −

c(n * )
)] and when it is positive, Φ(r0 ) > 0. To
n*

see this observe:

Φ (r0 )
c( n ∗ )
c(n * )
c(n ∗ )
= qˆ ⋅ v − r0 − ∗ = rˆ − r0 − * ≥ 0 ⇔ rˆ − r0 ≥ ∗ .
n
n
n
n∗

(E)

(E) says that if firms choose to move from the no screening allocation where all applicants are rewarded

r̂ to the allocation where firms screen and reward successful applicants r0 , it must be true that the
savings in the reward paid each accepted applicant [(rˆ − r0 )] exceeds the average cost of screening.
Obviously, this cannot always be true. There are two general cases to consider.

15

Case I: equilibrium with no screening and no segmented markets.

Here we reverse the final inequality in (E) and assume Φ (r0 ) ≤ 0 .

Since Φ(r) is strictly

decreasing on the relevant interval, expected returns with screening are everywhere negative except
possibly at r0 where such returns may equal zero. However, even if Φ (r0 ) = 0, with the reward equal to

r0 applicants would be paid less than under the no screening case. 5 So r0 cannot support a competitive
equilibrium since an entering firm could offer a reward between r0 and r̂ not screen and expect a
positive return.

In this case, screening costs are too high so the no screening complete pooling

equilibrium with zero firm profit is the unique competitive equilibrium.
Alternatively, assume the inequality in (E) holds strictly at r0 . This implies that Φ(r) vanishes
uniquely at some reward r ∗ . There are three sub cases to consider. In the first, r ∗ < rˆ and again the
unique competitive equilibrium is at r̂ with no screening.
Case II: equilibrium with screening and segmented markets.

In subcase II.a r ∗ = rˆ and the unique equilibrium at r̂ could have all firms screening or no firms
screening. Only in sub case II.b (Figure 1) where r ∗ > rˆ are the costs of screening low enough to
accommodate a competitive equilibrium with every firm screening. In what follows, the boundary case
( r ∗ = rˆ ) is ignored so that discussion of screening equilibrium assumes r ∗ > r̂.

5

By (C)

r0 = p (q1 x 0 ) ⋅ v and rˆ = qˆ ⋅ v making it clear that r0 < rˆ because the conditional

probability that the lowest screened applicant is qualified must be less than the proportion of all applicants
who are qualified.
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Figure 1 (Case IIb)

φ (r )

Φ(r0 ) = n ∗ ⋅ [rˆ − r0 ] − c(n ∗ ).

0

r

r0

r̂

r

∗

r1

Φ (r1 ) = −c(n*)
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What can be deduced about the properties of equilibrium in the primary market when screening
costs are not too high? From the final inequality exhibited in (E) we have surmised that if screening is
to occur it must be true that n ∗ ⋅ (rˆ − r0 ) ≥ c(n ∗ ). In moving from the reward price at a no screening
allocation ( r̂ ) to the lowest reward price with screening ( r0 ), the savings in reduced reward payments
must exceed the cost of screening. In effect, if screening is to be adopted by competitive firms, it must
pay for itself. And to do that the introduction of a screen must lower a firm’s non-screening costs. The
major result of the paper gives this intuition a more specific economic interpretation.

Proposition 1:
If the direct costs of screening are positive and the market screen is efficient, there is a
unique competitive equilibrium, it may or may not entail screening. For the competitive
equilibrium to entail screening it is necessary and sufficient that at the unique no
screening allocation the introduction of an efficient screen would show that the reduction
in the expected cost of accepting unqualified applicants (type II error) exceeds the
increase in the expected cost of rejecting qualified applicants (type I error) by at least the
cost of screening.
A proof of proposition 1 is given directly below. Prior to giving the proof, in order to appreciate
the result it will be illuminating to discuss the nature of the full costs of screening. As remarked earlier,
whether or not competitive firms invest in screening depends on the value of information obtained from
the screening mechanism. In order to examine this information, consider starting from an allocation
with no screening and zero profits. If a firm were to introduce screening at this allocation it could
anticipate increasing its return because the screen, by reducing the number of unqualified applicants
accepted, would lower the firm’s total reward bill without affecting its value added. However, this gain
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would also entail two costs. The first addition to costs would be the direct cost of screening c(n). The
second addition to costs would be the indirect cost associated with the fact that screening implies that
some qualified applicants who were accepted under no screening will now be rejected. It follows that if
screening is to increase net return above the no screening allocation the expected gains from rejecting
unqualified applicants must exceed the direct costs of screening plus the expected opportunity costs of
rejecting qualified applicants. If screening does pay for itself in this way, it is obvious that a firm active
at the no screening allocation with zero profit that takes the price r̂ as given and begins to screen would
raise its profits so Φ (rˆ) > 0. It is clear that a screening equilibrium exists.
To prove proposition one let xˆ = x(rˆ) (so x̂ equals a firm’s optimal acceptance policy at r̂ ) and
assume that the expected gain from rejecting unqualified applicants does exceed the sum of the direct
costs of screening plus the expected losses from rejecting qualified applicants, i.e.:
(1 − qˆ ) ⋅ rˆ ⋅ F0 ( xˆ ) > qˆ ⋅ (v − rˆ) ⋅ F1 ( xˆ ) +

c( n ∗ )
.⇒
n∗

(1 − qˆ ) ⋅ rˆ ⋅ F0 ( xˆ ) − qˆ ⋅ (v − rˆ) ⋅ F1 ( xˆ ) −

c(n ∗ )
+ [qˆ ⋅ v − rˆ] > 0 because [qˆ ⋅ v − rˆ] = 0. Thus, recalling that
n∗

G ( x) = qˆ ⋅ F1 ( x) + (1 − qˆ ) ⋅ F0 ( x), we have
qˆ ⋅ v ⋅ n ∗ ⋅ [1 − F1 ( xˆ )] − rˆ ⋅ [1 − (qˆ ⋅ F1 ( xˆ ) + (1 − qˆ ) ⋅ F0 ( xˆ ))] ⋅ n ∗ − c(n ∗ ) = Φ(rˆ) > 0. And there must exist an
equilibrium r ∗ such that rˆ < r ∗ < r1 . This proves sufficiency. To show necessity, suppose that a
competitive equilibrium with screening exists. This means there is a unique r ∗ > rˆ such that Φ(r ∗ ) = 0
and therefore because Φ(r ) is monotone decreasing in r, Φ(rˆ) > 0 . Reversing the steps used to show
sufficiency, the result follows immediately.
In an important sense, screening in competitive markets is all about identifying and rejecting
unqualified applicants. In the framework under consideration, firms have two options, they may screen
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or not screen. Clearly, screening will be chosen if and only if the value of the information it produces is
worth its cost. In determining the net value of information from screening, the status quo against which
the judgment to screen is made is to accept every applicant. Since the baseline of no screening already
accepts all qualified applicants firms cannot improve their returns by increasing the acceptance rates of
qualified applicants. The only way to increase returns is to use screening to reduce the proportion of
unqualified applicants accepted.
The essentials of this point are contained within Proposition 1 from which it trivially follows:

Remark 1:
If competitive firms invest in screening the equilibrium expected cost of a type II error
(1 − qˆ ) ⋅ r ∗ strictly exceeds the expected cost of a type I error qˆ ⋅ (v − r ∗ ) .

Because it illuminates the relationship between Bayesian decision theory and the economics of
firm optimization, an alternative demonstration of Remark 1 is provided. The result follows from the
firm’s choice of an optimal screening rule. From (C) we have that in a competitive equilibrium with
screening;

p (q1 x ∗ ) ⋅ v = r ∗ > rˆ = qˆ ⋅ v ⇒ f 1 ( x ∗ ) > f 0 ( x ∗ )
and the desired result follows immediately from (C’).
We note that in the statement of Remark 1 the expected costs of type I and II errors are based on
prior probabilities. As a consequence, the previous equation allows us to arrive at the intuitively
appealing result that for a competitive equilibrium to unambiguously entail screening the posterior
probability that a marginal acceptee is qualified must exceed the prior probability that a marginal
acceptee is qualified ( p (q1 x ∗ ) > qˆ ). And it follows that if equilibrium entails screening it must be true
that x ∗ > x ′ (the switch point where the likelihood ratio of the two densities equals one). Equivalently,
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in the border case where x ∗ = x(rˆ) we have, p (q1 / xˆ ) ⋅ v = rˆ. For an allocation with screening to be a
competitive equilibrium, the screening mechanism must signify that the screening index assigned to the
marginal accepted applicant is more likely to have been generated from the probability density for
qualified applicants. Thus, a necessary condition for screening to exist in equilibrium is that the value of
information be positive.

5. SECONDARY MARKETS

Given an equilibrium with screening represented by the descriptive parameters {r ∗ , x ∗ }the
primary market has rejected G ( x ∗ ) ⋅ N applicants. However, F1 ( x ∗ ) ⋅ N q of these applicants are in fact
qualified. The existence of these unselected but qualified applicants gives firms incentives to contract
with members of the pool of rejected applicants, and thus a secondary market may form. The formal
structure of the equilibrium in this secondary market is completely analogous to that in the primary
F1 ( x ∗ ) ⋅ N q

F1 ( x ∗ )
market. Let qˆ ( x ) =
=
⋅ qˆ denote the proportion of qualified applicants in the pool of
G( x ∗ ) ⋅ N
G( x ∗ )
∗

rejected applicants. The analysis of equilibrium in secondary markets proceeds as it did in the primary
market. We first note that qˆ ( x ∗ ) ≥

R
is a sufficient condition for the formation of a secondary market.
v

For in this case, denoting secondary market variables by the subscript i = 2,…m, it is possible that there
exists an equilibrium without screening in the secondary market that is defined by qˆ ( x ∗ ) ⋅ v = rˆ2 ≥ R. To
determine if there is an equilibrium with screening we return to Proposition One.
From Proposition One, there will be an equilibrium with screening in any secondary market if
and only if, starting from the market’s no screening pooling allocation, the expected reduction in type II
error costs exceed the expected increase in type I error costs by more than the cost of screening. The
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cost of a type II error (rˆi ) is decreasing while type I error cost (v − rˆi ) is increasing in i. However, since
the probability of making a type II error is increasing while the probability of making a type I error is
decreasing in i, the respective costs of type I and type II error appear to be indeterminate without further
restrictions on the model. In general there will be m ≥ 1 markets formed. It is trivial to show that each
such market has the property that its succeeding market has a smaller proportion of qualified applicants
and a lower reward to applicants. Moreover, if there is a final pool of rejected applicants failing to gain
admittance to any market, it must be true that qˆ m +1 ⋅ v < R.
We make one final observation about the structure of screening equilibria and their segmented
markets. In markets where the value added of qualified applicants is large relative to applicants’
reservation price, there is a tendency for the mth secondary market to pool applicants without screening.
This tendency is formalized in the following proposition. Recall that x’ the switch point is defined by

f1 ( x' ) = f 0 ( x' ).
Proposition 2:
If qˆ ( x ′) ⋅ v ≥ R , then the mth secondary market entails no screening and is a pooling
equilibrium with every remaining applicant accepted at the terms of trade
rˆm = qˆ ( x m* −1 ) ⋅ v.
To prove this proposition note if there is no screening in the primary market the proposition is
shown. Thus, assume there is screening in at least the primary market. To see that market m must have
a pooling equilibrium, assume otherwise. We have shown that any market (j) that has equilibrium with
screening must satisfy the condition that f1 ( x ∗j ) > f 0 ( x ∗j ). The last inequality implies x ∗j > x ′ for every
market j that has a screening equilibrium. Note that x m* is the acceptance criterion in market m. So if
market m has a screening equilibrium, x m∗ > x ′ and qˆ ( x m* ) is the proportion of qualified applicants
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among those who remain rejected. But qˆ ( x m* ) > qˆ ( x' ) ≥

R
. This implies that the pooling allocation
v

without screening defined by rˆm +1 = qˆ ( x m* ) ⋅ v is feasible and there exists an equilibrium in an (m+1)th
market, a contradiction.

The mth market must be a pooling equilibrium without screening

and rˆm = qˆ ( x m* −1 ) ⋅ v .

Robustness of Equilibrium

Some comments about this model have suggested an alternative specification with firms offering
applicants a continuous reward function r(x) giving a specific reward tailored to each value of the
screen. It is not difficult to show there exist such schedules which support a Nash equilibrium; e.g. let

r ( x) = p(q1 / x) ⋅ v −

c(n*)
. Firms could of course make distinctions in applicants’ rewards based on
n*

infinitesimal differences in screen scores but the objective of this paper is to examine the properties of
competitive equilibrium within the context of frequently observed firm behavior in a number of
important market settings. Moreover, it is straightforward to show that the competitive screening
equilibrium cannot be undermined by a firm offering a reward schedule r(x) that varies with applicants’
screen values.
Suppose a firm were to make such an offer in a market in competitive equilibrium at a reward
price r*. We note only applicants offered a reward greater than their competitive equilibrium offer will
accept. This requires r(x) > r* for all who accept the new offer. Furthermore, no profit maximizing firm
will offer any applicant a reward that exceeds the applicant’s expected value to the firm p (q1 / x) ⋅ v.
Because p (q1 / x) is increasing in x and p(q1 / x ∗ ) ⋅ v = r * by first order condition (C), it must be true
that r ( x)≤ r * all x ≤ x * . Therefore, x ≥ x * for all applicants accepting r(x). Moreover, the optimal
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number of applicants to screen will still equal n* where screening costs are minimized. Thus, for any
such r(x) and n the new firm’s expected profit per applicant will equal:

∫

x1

x*

[ p(q1 / x) ⋅ v − r ( x)]g ( x)dx −

c ( n)
<
n

∫

x1

x*

[ p(q1 / x) ⋅ v − r * ]g ( x)dx −

c(n*)
=0
n*

(F)

since r(x) > r* for all x > x*.
It is also true an entering firm could not make a profit by offering a reward schedule only
acceptable to applicants screened above x*; i.e. for some x > x *

< r * for x < x
r ( x)
> r * for x ≥ x.
To see this note that the inequality of integrals in (F) must hold for all x and not just x*. Moreover, for
any x other than x* the second integral must have a negative value. Otherwise the firms earning zero
profit in competitive equilibrium at r* could have chosen a different minimum acceptable x and earned a
positive profit. Since x* is the profit optimal screen value this is a contradiction.
A second means by which a competitive screening equilibrium might be undermined is by an
outside firm raiding an active firm’s pool of clients. In equilibrium, each successful applicant to a firm
receives a reward r * = qˆ ( x * )⋅ v −c(n * ) / n * . It has been suggested an inactive firm could (without cost)
identify all of the clients of an active firm and offer a reward slightly higher than r* to every such client
and make a profit because the poaching firm would not incur screening costs. The problem here is how
does the poacher uncover the information without cost? In order to ensure that it is hiring the exact
client base of an existing firm, the poacher must incur the same sorts of costs as did the active firms.
The poacher must make its offer known to the pool of applicants, and it must screen all interested parties
to ensure that it is contracting only with the clients of the firm it is poaching. It is clear that in most
market settings the poacher cannot obtain such information without cost. In particular, for the financial
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markets under discussion here it is unreasonable to assume that a poacher could identify another firm’s
geographically dispersed client pool except through some kind of industrial espionage gaining access to
the firm’s internal database of clients. Furthermore, client poaching of this kind does not seem
reasonable in markets where firms and clients are protected by contracts that obligate them to perform
certain actions for the other party. Even in labor markets, where contracts interpreted as indentured
servitude will not be enforced by courts, there are service jobs where employers protect trade secrets
from poaching by having new hires sign non-compete agreements. These non-compete agreements
prevent employees from doing the same kind of work for another employer for a defined length of time
after severing employment with the original employer. Such contracts are enforced in U.S. courts.1
Generally, the poaching argument will not work if poaching costs are at least as expensive as the
original screening costs. That assumption seems reasonable in cases where the original screening costs
are largely confined to interviewing and verification of information given by applicants as has been
assumed here. In the case where screening costs entail more substantial and costly actions so that
poaching costs are less expensive, the payment of a single reward to all successful applicants may be
vulnerable to poaching. Therefore, the results of this paper apply to markets where firms can enter
legally binding contracts with applicants that require the delivery of applicants’ services or payments, or
where screening costs are no larger than the costs that would necessarily be incurred by a would be
poacher.

CONCLUSIONS

Why do organizations screen? This question can be answered in at least two ways. Some people
claim that the motivation behind screening is to identify the best applicants. Others assert that screening
is a mechanism whose primary function is to identify and keep out undesirables. An economist might
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answer that these two explanations amount to the same thing. That is neoclassical economic intuition
suggests that in equilibrium the two assertions are likely to be indistinguishable. However, the results of
this paper provide support for the view that, at least in competitive markets where, unlike signaling
models information remains imperfect, screening is a gate keeping device. Competitive firms’
motivation to screen is based on their incentive to cut costs by identifying and rejecting applicants
perceived to be of lower quality.
However, in competitive equilibrium free entry of firms drives the applicant reward price upward
until firm profits equal zero. As a consequence, all of the benefits provided by firms’ investment in
better information ultimately accrue to successful applicants. Moreover, because the information
provided by the screen is imperfect, firms make errors in their acceptance decisions. Unavoidably,
applicants who screen well are rewarded more than those who do not screen well even in cases where
the underlying quality of the former is lower. In terms of social efficiency this result is disturbing.
Indeed, we have seen (Proposition 3) that under general conditions, the mth secondary market will entail
no screening and as a consequence ultimately all applicants are accepted by some market. Thus,
screening may merely redistribute income among applicants without any improvement in social
efficiency. In equilibrium, screening does not ultimately allocate resources any better than does pooling
of applicants without screening.
The model developed here provides a natural setting for investigating questions relating to
statistical discrimination in labor and credit markets: questions concerning who gets screened out, under
what conditions, and why. Most importantly, the relationship between screening and the formation of
segmented markets strongly suggests that reanalysis of the relationship between ethnic and gender
relations (beliefs about phenotypically identifiable groups and behavioral interactions among them) and
disparate economic treatment is likely to have starkly different implications than those suggested by
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standard models of statistical discrimination that are similar to signaling models (Aigner and Cain, 1977;
Phelps, 1972). However, a review of the economics literature suggests that only Coate and Loury
(1993) (who model the effects of affirmative action on promotion decisions in internal labor markets)
have utilized Bayesian decision making to analyze questions related to those considered here. The
model of binary choice screening and market segmentation developed in this paper can be used to
analyze a broad array of problems concerning resource allocation and equity in markets where
probabilistic decision making may well have significant ramifications for the differential treatment of
groups.
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